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Harris v. French, No. 98-34, 1999 WL 496941
(4th Cir. July 14, 1999)1
Colvin-El v. Nuth, Nos. 98-27, 98-29, 1999 WL
436776 (4th Cir. June 17, 1999)2
These two cases provide minimal guidance for situations in which the
sentencing jury is not the jury that decided the guilt portion of the trial.
In Harris v. French,3 a North Carolina trial court empaneled a new jury for
sentencing proceedings because of a delay caused when lead defense counsel
withdrew after being diagnosed with a fatal illness.4 The court discharged
the original jury and appointed new counsel.' The new jury recommended
that Harris be sentenced to death.6 In Colvin-El v. Nuth, the Maryland
Court of Appeals vacated the original death sentence and remanded for a
new sentence hearing! The new jury also sentenced Colvin-El to death.9
The North Carolina sentencing procedure at issue in Harris is similar
to that set out in section 19.2-264.4 of the Virginia Code." Harris argued,
inter alia, that the sentencing proceeding in his case violated the Double
Jeopardy clause." The Fourth Circuit, relying on Schiro v. Farley,2 held
that a sentencing proceeding is not a "subsequent prosecution," a prerequi-
site for a successful Double Jeopardy claim. 3 Harris's double jeopardy
1. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" at 182 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" at ___F.3d (4th Cir. 1999). Colvin-El filed a petition for
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court on September 15, 1999.
3. No. 98-34, 1999 WL 496941 (4th Cir. July 14, 1999).
4. Harris v. French, No. 98-34, 1999 WL 496941, at *3 (4th Cir. July 14, 1999).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Nos. 98-27, 98-29, 1999 WL 436776 (4th Cit. June 17, 1999).
8. State v. Colvin, 548 A.2d 506, 518 (Md. 1988).
9. Colvin-El v. State, 630 A.2d 725, 727 (Md. 1993).
10. See VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1999).
11. Harris, 1999 WL 496941, at *19; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. 510 U.S. 222 (1994).
13. Harris, 1999 WL 496941, at *19. In Schiro, the Supreme Court stated that a state's
single opportunity to prosecute a defendant "extends not only to prosecution at the guilt
phase, but also to present evidence at an ensuing sentencing proceeding." Schiro v. Farley,
510 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1994).
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claim therefore failed. 4 The same result will likely accrue under section
19.2-264.4 of the Virginia Code in cases where a new jury is empaneled.
In Colvin-El, there was a subsequent sentencing proceeding, but
Colvin-El did not raise a double jeopardy claim.'" Maryland, like Virginia,
has a "triggerman" rule.16 However, in Maryland the conviction does not
depend upon principalship; rather, principalship is a question for the jury
during the separate sentencing proceeding."7 The Fourth Circuit held that
permitting the sentencing jury to consider principalship and life/death in
a single proceeding did not unconstitutionally prejudice Colvin-El. 8 Al-
though the precise procedural situation in Colvin-El cannot arise in Virginia
because of the nature of Virginia's triggerman rule, the case appears to
support the proposition that subsequent sentencing proceedings can be as
broad as the original sentencing proceedings. 9
Ashley Flynn
14. Harris, 1999 WL 496941, at *19.
15. Colvin-El v. Nuth, Nos. 98-27, 98-29, 1999 WL 436776, at *4 (4th Cir. June 17,
1999).
16. See MD. R. CR. 4-343(g); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (Michie 1999).
17. MD. R. CR. 4-3 43(g).
18. Colvin-El, 1999 WL 436776, at *7.
19. Under section 18.2-18 of the Virginia Code, a determination of principalship is
made during the guilt phase of the trial. Except in the cases of murder for hire or killing
pursuant to direction of one involved in a continuing criminal enterprise, only a principal in
the first degree (the "triggerman") may be convicted of capital murder in Virginia. VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-18 (Michie 1999).
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